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STATE-CORPORATE CRIME IN THE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PRODUCTION COMPLEX: A CASE STUDY

David Kauzlarich, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1991

The objectives of this research are (1) to identify the charact
eristics of the environmental law violations committed during the
production of nuclear weapons, (2) to identify the historical forces
and events which have contributed to those violations, and (3) to use
data on the illegal acts of the nuclear weapons production complex to
help adjudicate between a number of competing explanations of the causes
of organizational crime.
This research, a qualitative, socio-historical case study, found
that a historical and structural level of analysis is best equipped to
explain the causes of the weapons production complex's criminality.

The

conclusion of this study is that the crimes of the weapons complex were
caused by the interplay of historical exigencies and geo-political
necessitations.
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CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

The Problem

The United States government has been producing materials for
nuclear weapons for over 45 years.

From the discovery of fission to

the present day, the United States has committed itself to the refine
ment and development of these weapons of mass destruction.

The process

of converting materials, such as plutonium and uranium, into useable
forms to create nuclear weapons generates an enormous amount of radio
active and non-radioactive waste which pollutes the air and water, and
poses a great threat to the health

and safety of

facility workers and

those who live near the production sites.
This research will focus on the criminal violations of environ
mental law committed by the United States nuclear weapons production
complex.

In recent years it has been revealed that a substantial number

of environmental law violations have occurred
the production complex.
1.

The three

at

objectives of

the 17 major sitesof
this research are:

To identify the characteristics of the environmental law

violations committed during the production of nuclear weapons.
2.

To identify the historical forces and events which have

contributed to those violations.
3.

To use the data concerning the illegal actions of the

nuclear

weapons production complex to help adjudicate between a number of

1
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competing theoretical explanations of the causes of organizational
crime.
The United States nuclear weapons production complex is owned by
the United States government and operated on a day to day basis by
private corporations. The illegal activities of the weapons complex are
best viewed as organizational crime.

That is, the law violations are

committed during the process of organizational goal attainment, and are
a byproduct of the organization's operative agenda.

The specific type

of organizational crimes the complex has committed are best character
ized as state-corporate crime:

"illegal or socially injurious actions

that occur when one or more institutions of political governance pursue
a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic
production and distribution" (Kramer & Michalowski, 1990, p. 13).
The significance of this research is three-fold.
a gap in the existing literature.

First, it fills

No criminologists have attempted to

analyze the crimes of the nuclear weapons production complex.

Second

ly, few scholars have attempted to evaluate the utility of the various
theoretical perspectives on the causes of organizational crime.

Final

ly, this research provides another case study of state-corporate crime,
a phenomenon which is clearly in need of additional scholarly research.

The United States Nuclear Weapons Production Complex

The wartime Manhattan Project was formed in 1942 for the sole
purpose of generating atomic weapons. This secretive and unregulated
enterprise succeeded in converting atomic energy into weapons of mass
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destruction.

The euphoria generated from producing an operable device

from an abstract theoretical notion about the nature of energy was
infectious, albeit to a select group of politicians and scientists.
The United States displayed its capacity to militarily devastate
a foreign nation in 1945 with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.

From the post-war period to the present day, the United

States has sustained its interest in developing more sophisticated and
destructive nuclear weapons.

Commonly dictated by the Cold War ideo

logy, the number of nuclear weapons produced by the United States has
oscillated:

during politically unstable periods, particularly during

the Truman and Kennedy years, nuclear weapons production soared; during
more stable times, weapons production decreased.
Not until the 1970s was there any real concern with the adverse
environmental effects produced by the generation of nuclear weapons.
The Cold War had provided a degree of hegemony in which the American
public believed that nuclear weapons production was the only real
avenue for ensuring that the United States would maintain its role
as a global power and be equipped militarily for combat with the
Soviets.

There was little concern about the massive amounts of waste

generated by the production of nuclear weapons.
Between the years of 1970 and 1977, a series of laws was passed
which were intended to regulate the emission of nuclear waste.

The

nuclear weapons production complex was reluctant to comply with these
new laws.

Indeed, there was little reason for it to be concerned

because the new laws were only officially enforced on the rapidly
expanding civilian nuclear power industry.

Governmentally owned
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industries were virtually ignored.

Although there is increasing evi

dence that this is changing, the governmentally owned nuclear weapons
complex is still not regulated with the same tenacity as the civilian
industry.
Most of the weapons production facilities are located in sparsely
populated areas, partly because they were built during World War II or
the Cold War, and rural locations were thought to be less susceptible
to enemy infiltration.

Additionally, a rural area facilitated the need

to preserve secrecy (less than a handful of people knew of the program
during the early forties).
There is a considerable amount of evidence that the radioactive
and hazardous waste generated by the weapons complex has caused serious
health problems to facility workers and to the surrounding communities:
Cancer rates in some of the areas near the production facilities are
the highest in the country; scores of facility workers have experienced
severe health problems; the rivers and streams near most of the pro
duction facilities are contaminated with nuclear waste; many of the
wildlife species residing near the facilities are contaminated with
radioactivity, and their offspring are commonly disfigured or die
quickly after birth (Abas, 1989; Conner, 1990; Mobilization for Survi
val, 1989; Stewart, 1988).
This research attempts to present the conditions, circumstances,
and characteristics of the United States nuclear weapons production
complex's criminal violations of environmental law.

Given the lack of

research on the crimes of the weapons complex and on instances of
private corporations and governmental agencies collaborating in
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criminality, this research has the capacity to provide a deeper empir
ical and theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of state-corporate
crime.

Hopefully, this research will also provide criminologists with

better understanding of the factors crucial to the explanation of organ
izational violations of law.

The Theoretical Literature

From White Collar Crime to Organizational Crime

The concept of organizational crime has its foundations in the
conceptualization of white collar crime developed by Sutherland
(1940, 1949).

Sutherland was one the first criminologists to focus

on the crimes of the powerful.

It was an enormous achievement that

gave rise to a distinct field of criminological research.
Although Sutherland's (1949) pioneering work was a great achieve
ment, many problems existed in his conceptualization.
his definition of white collar crime was ambiguous.

First of all,
He defined this

phenomenon as "a crime committed by a person of respectability and
high social status in the course of his occupation" (p. 9).

Obvious

ly this definition was unclear and open to many different interpre
tations.

Geis and Meier (1977, p. 25) have referred to it as an

"intellectual nightmare."

Another problem with Sutherland's concept

ualization is that he used the term white collar crime inconsistently.
At various points in the book he mentions fraud in different repair
businesses (some of which are blue collar occupations), white collar
crimes in politics, fraud in income tax returns, and fraud committed
by a shoe salesman.

Thus, there is considerable confusion as to what
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Sutherland actually meant by the concept of white collar crime.
It was several years after Sutherland's work that conceptual
breakthroughs in white collar crime research surfaced.

One of the

earliest of these breakthroughs was Clinard and Quinney's (1973)
effort to define white collar crime in more operational terms.

They

dichotomized the concept of white collar crime into corporate crime,
crimes organizationally based and directed towards corporate goals,
and occupational crime, acts committed by individuals during the course
of their occupation for their own personal gain.
Clinard and Quinney's breakthrough prompted another conceptual
advance in white collar crime research.

Drawing on the work of

organizational sociologists like Cohen (1977), Ermann and Lundman
(1978b), and Gross (1978), some criminologists began developing an
organizational

explanation of white collar crime.

This perspective

advanced the notion that organizations are social actors in their own
right that can be studied criminologically because they persist over
time, develop and maintain procedures, and pursue goals (Hall, 1987).
Thus, the organizational theorists maintained that organizations
themselves can and should be the unit of analysis rather than the
individual member of the organization.

This research will ground

its inquiry within the conceptual framework of organizational crime.
Although there are several different formal definitions of organ
izational crime (see Finney & Lesieur, 1982; Ermann & Lundman, 1978a),
Schrager and Short (1978) provide the most useful definition:
Organizational crimes are illegal acts of omission or
commission of an individual or group of individuals in a
legitimate formal organization in accordance with the
operative goals of the organization, which have a serious
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impact on employees, consumers, or the general public.
(p. 411)
Indeed, the United States nuclear weapons production complex is and has
engaged in illegal acts within a legitimate organizational structure;
the acts have taken place in accordance with its operational goals; and
its criminality has inflicted serious harm upon employees and the
general public.

Theoretical Perspectives on Organizational Crime

Having reviewed the evolution of the concept of white collar crime,
and the attempts which have been made to reconceptualize the notion,
the specific theoretical perspectives on the causes of organizational
crime will be reviewed.

There are three theoretical perspectives which

attempt to explain organizational crime:

(1) differential association

theory, (2) the organizational approach, and (3) political economy
theory.

There are also models which attempt to combine these three

theoretical models into an integrated explanation of organizational
crime.

Each of these perspectives will be reviewed.

The social psychological perspective is reflected in Sutherland's
(1949) differential association approach.

As Sutherland (1949) asserts:

Criminal behavior is learned in association with those who
define such behavior favorably and in isolation from those who
define it unfavorably, and that such a person in an appropri
ate situation engages in such criminal behavior if the weight
of the favorable definitions exceeds the weight of the unfav
orable definitions, (p. 234)
Partial support for differential association as a theory of white
collar crime has been found by a number of criminological researchers
(Albanese, 1982; Clinard, 1946; Cressey, 1950; Geis, 1967; Lane, 1953).
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While there can be no doubt that important insights have been derived
from this approach, some criminologists have criticized differential
association for its failure to incorporate the institutional level of
analysis (Braithwaite, 1985; Ermann & Lundman, 1978a; Gross, 1978;
Schrager & Short, 1978).

Theories which focus only on social

psychological variables, they contend, cannot adequately explain why
organizations, as social actors, violate the law.

As Schrager and

Short (1978) state:
Preoccupation with individuals can lead us to underestimate
the pressures within society and organizational structure,
which impel those individuals to commit illegal acts. These
difficulties make necessary and possible the analysis of
organizations as potentially criminal agents. Recognizing
that structural forces influence the commission of these
offenses does not negate the importance of interaction be
tween individuals and these forces, nor does it deny that
individuals are involved in the commission of illegal organ
izational acts. It serves to emphasize organizational as
opposed to individual etiological factors, and calls for
macrosociological rather than individual levels of explana
tion. (p. 410)
Organizational theorists hold that the explanation of organi
zational crime requires more than an individual level of analysis, and
argue that the organization itself should be central to an analysis of
organizational crime (Albanese, 1982; Clinard & Yeager, 1980; Ermann &
Lundman, 1978b; Gross, 1978, 1980; Hopkins, 1978; Kramer, 1982;
Needleman & Needleman, 1979; Schrager & Short, 1978; Sherman, 1980;
Vaughn, 1982, 1983).

The development of the organizational perspective

was hailed as an important theoretical advance in the field.

Braith

waite (1985) asserts that "theoretical progress began only in the
late 1970s when the individualistic theory spawned by the Sutherland
tradition was rejected in favor of applying organizational theory
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paradigms to the phenomenon" (p. 3).
The organizational theorists argue that "there is built into
the very structure of organizations an inherent inducement for the
organization itself to engage in crime" (Gross, 1978, p. 56).

A com

mon argument offered by researchers using this approach is that organ
izations are, by their very nature, strongly goal oriented and con
cerned with performance, and that this emphasis on goals and perform
ance may compel organizations to use illegitimate means to achieving
those goals.

As Finney and Lesieur (1982) note, "one of the key ideas

for understanding organizational crime is that formal organizations,
by their very nature, are strongly goal oriented and concerned with
performance" (p. 264).

Using the Mertonian rational goals blocked

opportunity model, these theorists maintain that organizations will,
if legitimate avenues for achieving goals are blocked, "innovate," and
employ illegitimate means for reaching goals.

As Gross (1978) states:

Now, as arrangements which are committed to goal attainment
or performance, organizations will often find themselves in
difficulties. They live in competitive environments, even in
socialist society, in which there are always insecurities and
uncertainties in supplies, money, sales, and securing support.
Given a situation in which the organization is judged (direct
ly or indirectly by sales or other indicators) by its success
in goal attainment or performance, one can predict that the
organization will, if it must, engage in criminal behavior to
attain those goals. (p. 57)
This model stresses the role of the external environment in
creating and sustaining strain which may result in illegal activity.
Most organizations are justified and evaluated in terms of their success
or failure in goal attainment.

Organizational goals are essentially

abstractions that are distilled from the desires of members and from
environmental and internal pressures (Kramer & Michalowski, 1990).
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Thus, organizational theorists argue that the organization, because
of the pressure on it to attain goals, will employ illegitimate
means for achieving such goals.

As Finney and Lesieur (1982) state,

"barriers to the attainment of desired performance may generate such
severe strain that agents resort to illegal solutions" (p. 270).

A

separate, but related approach within this theoretical perspective
stresses that crime may result from the internal management structure
of an organization.

Defective standard operating procedures may pre

vent an organization from achieving its goals legitimately, thus
pressuring the organization to turn to illegitimate means for achieving
goals (Hopkins, 1978).
Pursuing goals through illegitimate means, of course, is dependent
on the availability of those deviant means.

As Coleman (1987) points

out :
The variations in the menu of opportunities presented to the
occupants of different social statuses are one of the principal
ways structural constraints shape individual behavior, and the
distribution of such opportunities plays a major role in the
etiology of white collar crime. (p. 424)
Braithwaite (1989) offers two propositions of a theory of organiza
tional crime:
1.

Organizational crime is more likely to occur when an organiza

tion (or an organizational subunit) suffers major blockages of legiti
mate opportunities to achieve its goals.
2.

Organizational crime is more likely to occur when illegitimate

opportunities for achieving the organization's goals are available to
organizational actors.
The social control of organizations also plays a role in whether
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an organization will engage in unlawful behavior.1 As Finney and
Lesieur (1982) note "whether or not a strong performance orientation
and operating problems lead to crime depends also on the operationality of various social controls" (p. 275).

Similarly, Kramer and

Michalowski (1990) propose that organizational crime is more likely
to occur when various social control mechanisms fail to arrest the
tendency toward using illegitimate means to resolve strain.

Vaughn

(1982), however, is less confident in the effects of social control,
and asserts:
Despite increased measures devoted to social control,
organizational misconduct appears to be a natural accompan
iment to the complexity of business organizations and their
interactions that will continue as long as the structure of
opportunity and organizational goals remain the same.
(p. 1398)
The third theoretical view on organizational crime is the politi
cal economy perspective (Barnett, 1981; Box, 1983; Chambliss, 1988,
1989; Messersmith, 1986; Michalowski, 1985; Young, 1981).

The primary

assumption of this perspective is that the structure of corporate capi
talism provides an incentive for organizations to use illegitimate means
toward achieving profit, if legitimate means are blocked.

This per

spective extends the rational goals blocked model offered by the organ
izational theorists by considering the dynamics of capitalism, and how
this mode of production generates illegal activity.

As Barnett (1981)

asserts, organizational crime occurs:
When management chooses to pursue corporate goals through
circumvention of market constraints in a manner prohibited by
the state. Illegal circumvention of market constraints can be
translated into expected changes in cost relative to revenue,
that is, into changes in expected profits. One can expect
that a corporation will be relatively likely to choose to
engage in crime when the expected costs of its illegal action
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are acceptably low relative to perceived gains, other things
being equal. In this choice context, the type of offenses
committed by the corporation will depend on the relevant
market constraints and the severity of the related legal
constraint; that is a corporation will tend to circumvent
those constraints whose violation will yield the greatest
expected net change in profits. (p. 5)
While this argument seems to apply very well to the crimes of private
business corporations, it would not seem applicable to the crimes of
government.

But as Michalowski (1985) and Chambliss (1988, 1989) dem

onstrate, the political economy perspective can also be employed to
explain the organizational crimes of the state.

Michalowski (1985,

p. 314) has suggested that the various criminal acts that are usually
referred to as white collar crime can be brought together in the more
theoretically informed concept of "crimes of capital," which are "soc
ially injurious acts that arise from the ownership or management of
capital or from the occupancy of positions of trust in institutions
designed to facilitate the accumulation of capital."

He argues that

corporate crime, governmental crime, organized crime, and occupational
crime all arise from the particular forms of social relations associated
with the processes of capital accumulation, concentration, and
centralization.
One limitation of the political economy approach is its applica
bility to organizations in state capitalist or "socialist" society.
However, the organizational perspective and the political economy
perspective share many similarities with the exception of the specific
motivation for organizations to engage in crime.

As Gross (1978)

states, "The problem with organizations is goals--whatever the goals
happen to be.

Some organizations seek profits, others seek survival.
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Whatever the goals might be, it is the emphasis on them that creates
the trouble" (p. 59).
There have been three important attempts to form an integrated
theory of organizational crime.

Each of these theories will be briefly

reviewed.
First, Coleman (1987) attempts to integrate the social psycho
logical theory of motivation with the structural features of advanced
capitalism.

Using the notion

of the

"culture of competition," Cole

man bases his theory on the idea that criminal behavior results from a
coincidence of appropriate motivation and opportunity.

Ultimately,

Coleman rests his theory on the structural level of analysis, citing
capitalism as a major factor which causes organizational crime.
The second attempt to form an integrated theory of organizational
crime was offered by Braithwaite (1989).

Taking a more comprehensive

approach than Coleman, Braithwaite offers an integration of existing
criminological theories, particularly labeling theory, Hirschi's (1969)
control theory, subculture theory, and strain theory.

"The key to this

attempt," Braithwaite (1989) asserts, "is the notion of differential
shaming:

the shaming from organizational culture of compliance versus

the shaming from the subculture of resistance to regulatory law" (p.
333).

Particularly interesting, is Braithwaite's (1989) assertion that

"organizations can sustain a subculture of noncompliance more success
fully if they can employ a code of secrecy or create a smoke-screen
of differential accountability" (p. 341).

A major limitation of Braith

waite 's theory is that it ignores the possibility that organizations may
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sustain an entire organizational culture of non-compliance, rather than
just a subculture of non-compliance.
The third attempt to form an integrated theory of organizational
crime is Kramer and Michalowski's (1990) conceptual theory of statecorporate crime.

Proposing that there is a third major form of organ

izational crime (commonly only two forms are studied:

state-organized

and corporate crime), the authors offer the notion of "state-corporate"
crime: crimes committed through the interaction between state agencies
and private institutions.

This model rests on the hypothesis that

organizational crime results from a coincidence of appropriate motiva
tion or performance pressure, absent effective social control.
authors present three "core concepts" which motivate, or
a catalyst for organizations to engage in criminality:

The

act as
(1) the moti

vation or performance emphasis, (2) opportunity structures, and (3)
the operationality of social control. Each of these three concepts
is then analyzed on three different levels of analysis:
tural, institutional and individual.

the struc

Thus, Kramer and Michalowski's

model accounts for all levels of criminal organizational action.
This research will attempt to adjudicate between these rival
theoretical perspectives on the causes of organizational crime in light
of the data collected and analyzed concerning the crimes of the United
States nuclear weapons production complex.

Methods

This research will be conducted in a case study format.

According
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to Yin (1984) "A case study is an empirical inquiry that:

investi

gates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined;
and in which multiple data sources are used" (p. 23).
both historical and contemporary data are used.

In this project,

Most of the documents

come from governmental inquiries into the weapons complex's activities.
Other sources of data include interviews and the publications of various
special interest groups involved in the nuclear weapons issue.
According to Kramer (1978), the qualitative analysis of a social
phenomenon generally proceeds by asking three important questions:
1.

Out of what has the phenomenon come?

2.

What are the major features of the phenomenon? and

3.

What are the results, outcomes, or effects of the phenomenon?

In this research, the attempt to answer these three questions

is

conducted in a socio-historical approach.
According to Skocpol (1984), historical sociological studies have
four characteristics:
1.

They ask questions about social structure or processes

understood to be correctly situated in time and space;
2.

They address processes over time, and take temporal sequences

seriously in accounting for outcomes;
3.

They emphasize the interplay of meaningful actions and

structural contexts, in order to make sense of the unfolding of
unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and social
transformations; and
4.

They highlight the particular and varying features of specific
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kinds of social structures and patterns of change.
Indeed, this research is guided by the notion that the larger
structural conditions on a societal and international level play
important roles in the governmental policies of nation-states.

For

historical sociologists, Skocpol (1984) asserts, "the world's past is
not seen as a unified developmental story or as a set of standardized
sequences" (p. 2).

The evolution and contemporary meaning of the

weapons production complex can only be understood through a method
which accounts for change and process.
The specific vehicles used to answer the research questions of
this study are historical documents, governmental documents, and
interviews.

Thus, the data used in this project come from three

distinct types of sources.

As Yin (1984) has pointed out, using

multiple sources of data in case studies increases the likelihood of
researcher accuracy.
The historical documents used in this project are primarily those
publications which detail the history of the Atomic Energy Committee,
World War II, and the Cold War.

Additionally, more recently written

monographs which detail the history of both the atomic weapons complex
and nuclear weapons policy in general are used in this study.
Governmental documents used in this research include reports
produced by governmental agencies which have investigated a number of
facets of the weapons complex.

For example, this project relies heav

ily on the reports of the U.S. General Accounting Office, which has
evaluated the weapons facilities on several occasions regarding the
waste disposal practices and overall safety of the complex.

Other
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prestigious governmental agencies' evaluations of the weapons complex,
particularly that of the National Academy of Sciences, are used in this
research.

Examining the Department of Energy and its nuclear weapons

facilities requires the full use of governmental documents because
important information concerning its activities is commonly available
only through such United States government agencies.
Interviews have been conducted with those individuals who maintain
a reasonable degree of knowledge about various workings within the
weapons complex.
were unstructured.

The interviews, mostly conducted over the telephone,
This approach was taken in order to facilitate a

free, but focused, exchange of ideas between the present researcher and
the interviewee.

My reason for selecting this type of interview struc

ture is identical to Sennett and Cobb's logic employed in their 1972
landmark study on the hidden injuries of class.

In their study, they:

Had no rigid questionnaire to use in the interviews; we in
stead had a set of concerns that we wanted to explore, and
the actual questions were determined more by the particular
shape of the interview (p. 41).
The interviews conducted in this research were indeed shaped by the
particular nature of each idea being explored, and the interviewee was
given great autonomy in addressing the issues.

Thus, the questions that

were poised were specific enough to facilitate a consistent and focused
examination, yet flexible enough to accommodate a free exchange of ideas
(see Appendix B).
This research will tell the story of the United States nuclear
weapons production complex.

Entailed in this description lies an

exposition of the crimes committed during the process of manufacturing
nuclear weapons and materials.

It is hoped that research will be able
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to provide criminologists with a clearer understanding of the important
factors which contribute to organizational crime.
The findings of this study cannot be generalized to all instances
of state-corporate crime since it is but one case and not wholely
representative of the phenomenon of organizational criminality.

In

stead, the findings of this research may help confirm, clarify, or
even falsify the existing generalizations about the nature of statecorporate crime.

Since the scientific study of the phenomenon of state-

corporate crime is still in its infancy, the results of this research
could be instrumental in providing some insight into the phenomenon of
state-corporate crime.
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CHAPTER II

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE UNITED STATES'
EXPERIENCE WITH ATOMIC WEAPONS

This chapter traces the American experience with atomic weapons.
The major purpose of the chapter is to present the historical background
out of which the current situation at the weapons production complex has
arisen.

This historical review will focus primarily on the larger geo

political relationships in which the United States has been involved.
Additionally, this historical overview is presented to facilitate a
better understanding of the evolution of the production complex within a
larger structural context.

As Mills (1959) wrote over 30 years ago,

"Every social science--or better, every well considered social study-requires a historical scope of conception" (p. 145).

Atomic Energy:

The Early Years

The United States' experience with atomic energy began in 1942 when
a team of scientists led by Enrico Fermi succeeded in achieving the
first controlled, self-sustained nuclear reaction.

Within months, the

Manhattan Engineering District, commonly referred to as the Manhattan
Project, was formed with the sole mission of developing atomic weapons.
In 1942, under the military supervision of General Leslie Groves, and
the scientific supervision of J. Robert Oppenheimer, three facilities
were created to develop the bomb.

Los Alamos, New Mexico was chosen

to be the site where the design, testing, and assembly of atomic weapons

19
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would occur.

In Hanford, Washington, a facility was created to

produceplutonium, and in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, a uranium separation
plant was created.

These three facilities combined to form the $2

billion enterprise called the Manhattan Project.
These facilities operated in extreme secrecy both outside and
inside the complex (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984; Cochran, 1988; Center for
Defense Information, 1989; Powaski, 1987; Williams & Cantelon, 1984).
As Weiner (1990) states, "(secrecy) had become as crucial a component of
the bomb as uranium" (p. 20).

Clarfield and Wiecek (1984) describe the

secrecy at one of the earliest facilities:
The residents of Los Alamos became, in some sense non-persons.
Children born there could not have the location entered on
their birth certificates. No one was allowed to tell the
families and friends they left behind where they lived. Army
counter-intelligence corps personnel read all outgoing as well
as incoming mail. All buildings except housing and community
facilities were restricted-access, enforced by security
badges. (p. 34)
The activities of the Manhattan Project were hidden very well.
Until 1944, "funds for the project came either from the military
departments, which concealed their purpose, or from a special con
tingency fund appropriated for the President which was shielded from
congressional scrutiny" (Powaski, 1987, p. 7).

The activities of the

complex were so secret, in fact, that when Harry Truman, a senator at
the time of the Manhattan Project, assumed the presidency in 1945, he
had absolutely no knowledge of the Manhattan Project (Clarfield &
Wiecek, 1984; Powaski, 1987; Williams & Cantelon, 1984).
The primary reason, and perhaps the sole reason, for the extreme
secrecy surrounding the activities of the Manhattan Project was because
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the United States feared German access to the bomb (Powaski, 1987;
Williams & Cantelon, 1984).

The Roosevelt administration feared the

leakage of information so much that in addition to keeping the
activities of the Project secret from the Germans, it also kept the
information away from the United States Congress, media, and public
(Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984; Powaski, 1987).

The Germans had entered

World War II with the lead in nuclear research:

Otto Hohn and Fritz

Strassman had already split the atom in 1938; the Third Reich controlled
one of the richest sources of uranium in the world; and Germany had been
pursuing the development of atomic weapons at least four years longer
than the United States (Powaski, 1987).
The Manhattan scientists were made very much aware of the German
threat, and were pressured to "beat Germany to the bomb" (Powaski, 1987;
Williams & Cantelon, 1984).

However, this was not the only motivation

for the hurried development of the bomb.

After the German surrender,

Oppenheimer stated (quoted in Powaski, 1987) "I don't think there was
any time we worked harder at the speed-up than in the period after the
German surrender" (p. 12).

Two main reasons seemed to have caused this:

the Japanese threat, and the Soviet Union.
After the German surrender, the only immediate threat to the United
States was Japan.

As early as 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that

when a bomb "is finally available, it might, perhaps, after mature
consideration, be used against the Japanese" (quoted in Powaski, 1987,
p. 13).

On August 6, 1945, only months after Truman took office, and

days after the first usable forms of plutonium and uranium were produced
at Hanford and Oak Ridge, the United States dropped a uranium bomb on
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Hiroshima.

Three days later, on August 9th, a plutonium bomb was

dropped on Nagasaki.

Both Japanese cities were destroyed.

A Navy

officer (quoted in Rhodes, 1986) described the after-effects:
A smell of death and corruption pervades the place. The
general impression, which transcends those derived from the
evidence of our physical senses, is one of deadness, the
absolute essence of death in the sense of finality without
hope of resurrection. It's everywhere, and nothing has
escaped its touch, (p. 742)
In total, nearly 400,000 people died as a result of the bombings
(Rhodes, 1986).

The United States had clearly shown the world that it

was in command of the ability to harness nuclear energy.

After this

awesome display of power, the Japanese surrendered, and the birth of a
new conflictual relationship was born, the Cold War between the United
States, and its former ally, the Soviet Union.
The United States' concern over losing its monopoly on nuclear power
manifested itself prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan.
In April 1945, the United States ordered its Army to bomb the nuclear
production facilities in Berlin.

The Germans were making significant

progress toward harnessing nuclear energy operations into weapons. The
idea of this mission was to destroy laboratories and other facilities
which were associated with nuclear energy before the planned Soviet
Union invasion of Berlin, scheduled a few months later (Powaski, 1987).
The reason for the mission, code-named Alsos, was clear.

As General

Groves stated (quoted in Powaski, 1987) "our principal concern was to
keep information and atomic secrets from falling into the hands of
Russia" (p. 40).

In the end, the operation succeeded, and Russia was

denied access to the blueprints for the new weapon.
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Post World War II: The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The end of World War II signified the beginning of a massive effort
on the part of the United States to raise the sophistication of atomic
weapons.

At this time, the United States military, the primary benefi

ciary of nuclear energy research, lost control of the rights to produc
ing atomic weapons.

Considerable debate took place between the propon

ents of placing atomic energy into civilian control, principally advo
cated by the Federation of Atomic Scientists, and those who wanted
atomic energy to stay in the hands of the military.
scientists won the legislative battle.

In the end, the

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,

sometimes referred to as the McMahon bill, established the independent
civilian-controlled Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Under this Act, the
military could only gain access to the bomb by a direct presidential
order.

Although the AEC, in principle, was a civilian body, the

military had an enormous influence over atomic energy policies and
operations (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984; Powaski, 1987).

As Powaski (1987)

explains:
Organizationally, military emphasis was built into the struc
ture of the AEC from the beginning. One of its four operat
ing divisions was military applications. A military liaison
committee was appointed by the Department of Defense to par
ticipate in the AEC's weapons work. The armed services re
tained for themselves the intelligence function of the Man
hattan Project, rather than transferring it to the AEC. The
ties were so close that an incoming secretary of defense is
supposed to have asked, after being shown the Department of
Defense organization chart "Where is the AEC"? (p. 123).
One of the first postwar responsibilities of the AEC was the
transformation of military applications of nuclear energy to civilian
uses (Powaski, 1987).

Robert Oppenheimer, the chair of the AEC, clearly
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wanted to see a complete effort toward this goal, and argued vehe
mently for the peaceful application of atomic energy.

Enrico Fermi,

the scientist credited with the first successful attempt at generat
ing a sustained nuclear reaction, and who also resided high in the AEC
hierarchy, argued that primacy should be directed toward future weapons
programs.

In the end, according to Powaski (1987):

The Fermi view prevailed, and the recommendation for priority
in weapons was instrumental in committing the AEC to the same
view, which in turn was the basis for President Truman's
policy decision to make weapons the highest priority of the
American atomic energy program. (p. Ill)
Of all the responsibilities granted to the AEC, nowhere has it been
found that the committee monitored the environmental effects of the pro
duction of nuclear materials.

The AEC neglected to consider and create

policy which would control the adverse environmental effects which occur
during the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials (Steele,
1989).

As former AEC General Manager Carroll L. Wilson stated in 1979,

"Nobody got brownie points for caring about nuclear waste.

The Atomic

Energy Commission neglected the problem" (Steele, 1989, p. 19).
From 1945 to 1953, Truman embarked upon a massive buildup of
nuclear weapons by creating nine new production facilities.

A major

reason cited for this buildup was the threat of the Soviet Union.

The

Soviets, in 1949, successfully tested an atomic bomb, ending the United
States monopoly and "inaugurating the era of proliferation" (Williams &
Cantelon, 1984, p. 114).

From this time on, relations between the

United States and the Soviet Union dictated, to a large degree, the
quantity and quality of the United States production of nuclear weapons.
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Soon after the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb, a meet
ing was called between Truman and the AEC's chair David Lilienthal.
Lilienthal was planning on presenting a report to Truman which argued
against the development of the newly conceptualized hydrogen bomb.
Powaski (1987) describes the meeting:
He (Truman) cut short Lilienthal's presentation and did not
even bother to read the report's analysis. He simply asked
"Can the Russians do it?" When all heads nodded affirma
tively, Truman responded "In that case, we have no choice.
We'll go ahead." (p. 56)
Recalling the meeting later, Lilienthal wrote that his effort to
block the development of the hydrogen bomb was like saying "no to a
steam roller" (Powaski, 1987, p. 57).

The AEC, he felt, had become

nothing more than a major contractor to the Department of Defense
(Powaski, 1987).
The decision to develop the hydrogen bomb was also conducted in
extreme secrecy (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984; Powaski, 1987; Williams &
Cantelon, 1984).

Similar to the secrecy surrounding the initial deve

lopment of the bomb during the Manhattan era, "there was no public, or
even congressional debate, over the decision to develop the hydrogen
bomb" (Powaski, 1987, p. 57).

Thus, similar circumstances surround the

two major decisions to develop atomic weapons;

both were conducted in

secrecy; both projects operated under no formal or informal social
control; and both decisions were based on the threat of an outside
nation or nations.

This prompted immense pressure on atomic scientists

and the AEC to perform a sole function:

developing bombs.

On the same day that Truman approved the production of the hydrogen
bomb, he also operationalized the suggestions called for in a report
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called NSC-68.

This study called "for an enormous increase in American

defense spending in order to prevent Soviet domination of the world"
(Powaski, 1987, p. 217).

Thus, nine new nuclear weapons production

facilities were created to accommodate this mission.
In 1954, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was replaced by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954.

As Clarfield and Wiecek (1984) explain:

The new statute did not altogether overturn the old; rather,
it was a complex, tangled and inconsistent cloth of com
promises and evasion that marked a determined, if stumbling,
effort to create a strategy framework in which civilian
nuclear power might develop in the United States and be
exported into the international market. (p. 185)
Most of the specific provisions of the new act, and all the
licensing and related regulatory requirements, applied solely to
commercial reactors regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Thus, the Act of 1954 did little to change the Act of 1946 in relation
to the government's use of nuclear energy.

The government's nuclear

weapons production complex remained exempt from any real outside
monitoring and did not have to follow the somewhat strict regulations
on the emerging civilian nuclear industry.

Despite Eisenhower's "Atoms

For Peace" plan, the military application of nuclear energy grew
substantially during these years.

As Lamperti (1984b) notes:

It [the AEA of 1954] hardly had any effect on the development
and manufacture of nuclear weapons by the AEC. Despite hopes
that "Atoms For Peace" could mean turning swords into plow
shares, the production of atomic "swords" continued with
little change with the new law. (p. 70)
The production of nuclear weapons peaked between the late 1950s
and early 1960s.

During this time, twenty military nuclear weapons

facilities were operating at peak capacity (Cochran, 1988).

As Weiner

(1990) describes:
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By 1958, nuclear weaponry was an infinitely expanding dynamo.
The target list had grown to some 20,000 dots on the communist
map. The target list included every city in Russia, Eastern
Europe, and China. (p. 35)
By 1960:
Three thousand two hundred and sixty-seven nuclear warheads
(could) annihilate the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe
in a single blinding blow. They planned to follow this apo
calyptic spasm with thousands, and thousands of more bombs.
Ten nations would be obliterated. Five hundred million people
would die. (p. 37)
The United States feared the Soviet Union to such a degree that by 1960,
the United States had assembled a nuclear arsenal that maintained the
capacity of over 1.5 million Hiroshimas (Weiner, 1990).
A number of factors are thought to be responsible for this buildup:
Anti-communism was proliferating; relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States were becoming increasingly antagonistic; the Soviet
Union had launched Sputnik; and the myth of a weapons gap provided the
United States with the motive for increased warhead production.

The

weapons gap myth is identified by Powaski (1987) as "ultimately
resulting in the production of hundreds of unneeded ballistic missiles"
(p. 73).

Indeed, this weapons production frenzy was in part caused by

the adversarial nature of the United States and the Soviet Union's
relationship.
During the Kennedy years (1961-1963), nuclear weapons production
reached its zenith with over 5,000 weapons being produced each year
(Cochran, 1988) . Along with the tense climate of the Cold War, and the
residual effects of McCarthyism, the antagonistic relations between the
Soviet Union and the United States accelerated with events such as the
Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis (see Powaski, 1987).

Between
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1964 and 1976, however, nuclear weapons production decreased.

President

Johnson shut down ten weapons production facilities because of abundant
stocks of plutonium (Cochran, 1988).

The SALT talks, and the attitude

of some high level officials in the government, particularly Johnson's
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, that weapons proliferation was
futile, fostered this cut back in nuclear weapons production (Powaski,
1987; Williams 6c Cantelon, 1984).
This brief survey of the years between 1942 and the early 1970s
has raised a number of important points.

First of all, the United

States has continually conducted its weapon production operations in
extreme secrecy.

As a result of this immense secrecy, the operations

have been conducted without independent oversight by a non-partial
committee, and thus the program has not been subject to formal or in
formal social control.

Second, the pressure to produce weapons very

quickly, both on the AEC and the production facility workers and
scientists, has been a central tendency of the operations especially
during the early and late 1940s.

Third, the nature of the relations

between the United States and the Soviet Union have dictated, to a
significant degree, the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons pro
duction.

This competitive mentality has its roots in the philosophy

developed during the Manhattan Project, when Germany was the primary
enemy.

Finally, there is no indication that the environmental conse

quences of the production of nuclear weapons and material have ever
been a major concern.
producing weapons.

The emphasis seems solely placed on one goal:

These five issues have many implications for the

theoretical models that will be evaluated in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER III

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY:

THE ORGANIZATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES

In this chapter, data will be presented concerning the nature and
extent of the organizational crimes committed by the Department of
Energy (DOE) weapons production complex.

After a brief discussion of

the general organizational structure and goals of the complex, the focus
of this chapter shifts to an examination of the circumstances and
particular manner in which DOE facilities violate environmental law.

The Organization of the Weapons Complex

In 1974, the Energy Reorganization Act abolished the Atomic Energy
Commission and established two new organizations:

the Energy Research

and Development Administration (ERDA), and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). The legislation was enacted in response to concerns
that the AEC was functioning as both regulator (of civilian industries),
and promoter of nuclear programs (through the military) (Powaski, 1987;
Radioactive Waste Campaign, 1988).

ERDA was established to oversee the

promotional and defense productions, while the regulating and licencing
operations for commercial nuclear power were assigned to the NRC
(Radioactive Waste Campaign, 1988).
There is little information about ERDA and its specific activities
except that it followed the same basic policies as the AEC and that many
of the workers for the newly formed ERDA were former AEC employees
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(Lamperti, 1984b; Radioactive Waste Campaign, 1988).

Perhaps the lack

of information on ERDA is because the agency was abolished by President
Carter in 1977, only three years after its creation.
The Department of Energy was formed by Carter to "give a clear
direction and focus to America's energy future by providing the
framework for carrying out a comprehensive, balanced energy policy"
(U.S. Department of Energy, 1979, p. 2).

As a part of orchestrating

this "new direction," the Department of Energy was given the responsi
bility of producing nuclear weapons.

Although manufacturing nuclear

weapons is only a fraction of DOE's responsibilities, it has tradition
ally devoted one-third of its funds to warhead production (Lamperti,
1984a).2
The basic mission of DOE defense activities is to produce fuel for
the U. S. Navy and material for nuclear weapons (U.S. General Accounting
Office, 1986).

The DOE oversees the production of nuclear weapons and

materials at 17 major facilities around the country:

6 facilities

produce nuclear material, 6 other plants both produce material and
assemble components into warheads, and 5 facilities design and test
nuclear weapons (see Appendix A). Almost all of these facilities were
created in the 1940s and 1950s.
The entire complex employs over 100,000 workers, produces, modi
fies, or retires approximately 4,000 weapons a year, and has an annual
budget of 8 billion dollars (Center for Defense Information, 1989).
DOE, like its predecessors, the AEC and ERDA, carries out most of its
programs by contracting with private firms and universities.

Most of

the contractors of the DOE are large, multi-national corporations.
Corporate giants such as Westinghouse, DuPont, General Electric, and
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Martin Marietta operate most of the DOE facilities.
The United States government owns the equipment and materials
used in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons items, and directs the
contractor to produce the final product, whether it be the warheads
themselves, or the converted nuclear materials.

Thus, the contractor

is responsible for the actual production of the nuclear weapons, while
the DOE acts as a supervisor of the contractor's activities.

The

organization of the entire weapons complex has much in common with the
system that developed during the Manhattan Project era (Cochran, 1988;
Lamperti, 1984b; Powaski, 1987).

That is, private contractors have

maintained the important role of researcher, developer, and manufac
turer of the entire nuclear weapons program.

The DOE-Contractor Relationship

There are two basic kinds of financial arrangements the DOE makes
with its contractors.

Some contractors operate on a non-profit basis,

in which they receive compensation only for the costs incurred during
the production of nuclear weapons. Other contractors operate on a
profit basis, or "award fee" arrangement.

In this type of contract,

DOE agrees to pay a contractor bonus money if, during a six-month per
iod, the contractor meets certain pre-established criteria.

Although

each contract the DOE makes with its corporate operators is different,
most contracts contain essentially the same provisions (Alverez, 1990;
Mobilization for Survival, 1989).
The DuPont corporation has operated the Savannah River Plant,
located in Aiken, South Carolina, since the inception of the atomic age.
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On a non-profit basis, DuPont has been held responsible for the day to
day operations of the facility.

One clause in the DOE-DuPont (National

Academy of Sciences, 1987) contract reads:
The Contractor shall take all reasonable precautions in the
performance of the work under this Contract to protect the
safety of employees and of members of the public and to
minimize dangers from all hazards to life and property, and
shall comply with all health, safety, and fire protection
regulations and'requirements. (p. 44)
The exact same provision in which the DOE orders DuPont to comply
with all applicable laws and regulations, is included in DOE's 1987
contract with UNC Nuclear Industries, the operator of the Hanford
facility located in Hanford, Washington.

It seems, then, that the only

difference between the two contracts, in relation to the mandates of
the DOE concerning the contractor's obligation to perform all activities
in compliance with applicable environmental laws, is that UNC operates
under a profit arrangement with the DOE, whereas DuPont operates its
facility under a non-profit arrangement (National Academy of Sciences,
1987).

Thus, it seems apparent that the DOE places the bulk of the

responsibility on the contractor to operate the facilities in a lawful
manner.
The National Academy of Sciences (1987) has argued that DOE
directives to their contractors are often vague and that they provide
the corporations with a great deal of latitude in the interpretation of
DOE orders.

This research has found some evidence which seems to sup

port this claim.

For example, in the 1987 DOE-UNC contract, the DOE

ordered UNC to "operate and monitor the N Reactor and support facilities
in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner to achieve a fiscal
year production goal of 705 KMWD, with less than 24 unscheduled outage
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days" (National Academy of Sciences, 1987, p. 51).

While this direct

ive may be legally inclusive, and thus rather direct in nature, the
DOE does not provide the contractor with the specific methods to achieve
compliance with applicable environmental issues.

It is in this sense

that the DOE orders could be considered relatively vague.

Additionally,

the above clause seems to indicate that the DOE is sending a message to
the contractor that while safe and environmentally sound procedures of
waste disposal (which are unspecified) are important, it is equally
important that precise production quotas are met.

The Organizational Management Structure

The organizational structure of the weapons production complex has
changed very little over the years.

The complex still uses a three-tier

approach to attempt to carry out its operations.
The first tier is the contractor who actually performs the day to
day operations.

The contractor develops its own environmental protect

ion program and periodically checks on its implementation through
internal audits and self-appraisals (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1986).

The contractor is held responsible to meet all DOE environ

mental, health, and safety requirements as a condition of the contract
between the DOE and the contractor (Walker, 1986).

Thus, the contractor

has a high degree of responsibility in insuring that the work is carried
out in compliance with all applicable environmental laws (Alverez, 1990;
National Academy of Sciences, 1987; U.S. General Accounting Office,
1986).
The second tier of the management structure resides in the DOE
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itself.

The DOE field offices are directly responsible for overseeing

the contractors' performance.

The field offices periodically conduct

appraisals and audits on the contractors' work including incident re
leases and quality assurance (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986).
The final tier of the management structure is the general over
sight by DOE headquarters.

The office of the Assistant Secretary for

Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) holds primary responsibility for
the entire complex's compliance with environmental law.
ways this is done:

There are three

(1) by appraising the field offices' environmental

protection activities, (2) reviewing plans for each field office on how
it is going to carry out its respective environmental programs, and (3)
reviewing accidents and unusual occurrences at DOE facilities (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1986).
Having reviewed the general features, goals, and organizational
structure of the weapons production complex, the discussion will now
focus on the violations of environmental law committed by the weapons
complex.

The next section of this research attempts to capture the

manner in which the production of nuclear weapons and materials has
violated several environmental regulations and standards.

The Criminal Contamination of the Environment

The Extent of the Contamination

The process of converting nuclear material into useable forms
generates a large amount of radioactive and non-radioactive (hazardous)
waste (Cochran, 1988; Lamperti, 1984b; Reicher & Scher, 1988; U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1985, 1986, 1989).

In 1986, the Savannah
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facility generated over 200,000 gallons of waste each day, and the
Hanford plant has dumped over 200 billion gallons of radioactive and
hazardous wastes since its inception in 1942 (Steele, 1989).

Indeed,

the contamination wrought by nuclear weapons production is so severe
that the General Accounting Office estimates that the cost of getting
the complex into compliance with applicable environmental laws would be
a startling 250 billion dollars (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986).
The waste disposal practices employed by most of the DOE facili
ties are grounded in the theory that "soil absorbs radioactive and haz
ardous elements in waste, and harmlessly extinguishes all potentially
dangerous chemicals" (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986, p. 31).
Thus, seepage basins and waste ponds are used as containers to filter
out the harmful elements in the waste.

The problem with this method of

disposal, employed since the beginning of the atomic age, is that soil
does not, in fact, prevent harmful elements in waste from seeping into
groundwater basins (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986).

A dramatic

example of this is found in the waste disposal practices of the Savannah
facility.

Because of their waste disposal practices, the Tuscaloosa

Aquifer, part of the Tuscaloosa Group Formation of underground water
passages, is now contaminated with several harmful elements including
tritium and nitrates (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986).
The Hanford facility and the Savannah River Plant have been iden
tified by several commentators as being two of the most environment
ally damaging nuclear weapons facilities (Mobilization for Survival,
1989; Saleska 6c Makhijani, 1990; Steele, 1989).

Both facilities are

involved in the production of plutonium and tritium, compounds which
play an integral role in making completed warheads.

The Mobilization

for Survival (1989) has documented the existence of several adverse
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environmental consequences wrought by the activities of the Hanford
facility:
100 square miles of groundwater are contaminated with
radioactive tritium, iodine, and toxic chemicals. Over a half
million gallons of high level radioactive waste [have] leaked
from underground tanks and more continues to leak into the
soil. Billions of gallons of liquid wastes and waste water
with chemical and radioactive elements have been dumped in
Hanford soil, contaminating the Columbia River and its
watershed. (p. 3)
Steele (1989) has also documented the history of the horrible disregard
for the environment that has taken place at Hanford since the beginning
of the atomic age.

A few of her findings are:

between 1944 and 1955,

537,000 curies of unfiltered airborne releases of iodine were released
into the atmosphere; between 1952 and 1967, ruthenium-contaminated
nitrate flakes fell on nearby farmers' fields, and ultimately resulted
in the death of several hundred cattle; and there are over 60 "lost"
burial sites of waste which have not been found because of the secret
methods of waste disposal used by World War II scientists.

The Hanford

facility has a long record of abuse and neglect concerning the
environment.
Equally poor is the Savannah River Plant's environmental record.
The groundwater near the plant is contaminated with nearly all forms of
radioactive and hazardous waste, and over 51 million gallons of highly
dangerous toxins are stored in leaking underground tanks beneath the
facility (Mobilization for Survival, 1989).
Historically, the complex was not required to comply with any laws
regarding the protection of the environment.
1946 and 1954 made this condition explicit.

The Atomic Energy Acts of
Today, the DOE is still
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exempt from laws which regulate the disposal and treatment of radio
active waste.

Violations of Environmental Law

The DOE regulates itself for radioactive releases into ground
and surface water, radioactive waste, and radioactive leaks into water.
There are three principal environmental laws the DOE must comply with:
(1) the Clean Water Act of 1972, (2) the Clean Air Act of 1970, and
(3) the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976.

It is

extremely important to remember that the nuclear weapons production
complex operated for over 28 years before having to comply with a single
environmental law.

The DOE has fought the applicability of these laws

to their operations for several years.
DOE's refusal to comply with RCRA3.

Especially tenacious was the

In the eight years between the 1976

passage of RCRA and the 1984 court ruling by a district judge that the
DOE was subject to this law, the DOE argued that under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, their activities were exempt from the law because of
"national security" (Radioactive Waste Campaign, 1988; Reicher & Scher,
1988).
RCRA gives the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority
to regulate DOE's hazardous waste disposal practices.

DOE's activities

generate an enormous amount of hazardous waste, and it is common know
ledge that they are out of compliance with this law (Alverez, 1990;
Center for Defense Information, 1988; Cochran, 1988; Radioactive Waste
Campaign, 1988; Reicher & Scher, 1988; U.S. General Accounting Office,
1985, 1986, 1989).

Millions of gallons of hazardous waste surround some
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DOE facilities (Radioactive Waste Campaign, 1988).

Because RCRA became

applicable to DOE facilities in 1984, in 1986 several facilities were
out of compliance with the law.

In a 1986 study conducted by the U.S.

General Accounting Office (1986), all seven of the facilities reviewed
were out of compliance with RCRA.4 Under RCRA, "an operator must
identify its hazardous wastes; receive a permit in order to treat,
store, or dispose of such wastes; monitor ground water at waste sites;
close and care for sites that are taken out of operation; and undertake
corrective action" (Reicher, 1986, p. 205).

By 1986, most facilities

had only begun the process of obtaining permits, a clear violation of
law.

In 1985, a report by the Ohio EPA also found numerous violations

of RCRA at the Fernald Feeds Materials Plant located in Fernald, Ohio.
Historically, safe waste disposal practices were largely ignored because
there were no laws which were applicable to the production complex.
Extreme amounts of hazardous wastes were disposed of at most DOE
facilities, including the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where four
waste dis- posal plants were found to be leaking 4.7 million gallons of
metal, acids, and solvents between the years of 1953 and 1963 (Reicher 6t
Scher, 1988).
The Clean Water Act is "the principal law governing the discharge
of liquid fluids from DOE facilities into water" (U.S. General Account
ing Office, 1986, p. 30).

RCRA and the Clean Water Act are not mutually

exclusive laws because most of the contamination of water results from
the violation of RCRA, that is, illegal waste disposal practices.
the same 1986 General Accounting Office report that identified RCRA
violations, noncompliance with the Clean Water Act was determined.
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Out of the nine facilities surveyed, all of the sites were in violation
of the Clean Water Act.

The water was most often contaminated with

tritium, mercury, and nitrates.

At the Y-12 plant, nitrate concentra

tions have been reported at a level 1,000 times the drinking water
standard.

At the Savannah River Plant, solvents have been reported at

levels 30,000 times over the EPA's drinking water standards, and tritium
levels over 2,500 times the standard.

As with the DOE's violations of

RCRA, the activities of the complex are being conducted in violation of
the Clean Water Act.
The most publicized violations of environmental laws by the DOE
were found in the June, 1988 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
EPA raid on the Rocky Flats facility near Denver.

Rocky Flats manu

factures the plutonium parts of nuclear warhead cores and various other
fission bomb components (Abas, 1989).

The FBI raid was prompted by Jim

Stone, a six-year Rocky Flats engineer, who uncovered an internal DOE
memo which described the operations at Rocky Flats as "patently illegal"
and "in poor condition generally in terms of environmental compliance"
(Abas, 1989, p. 22).

Stone contacted the FBI, and search warrants were

issued to search the facility for possible violations of environmental
law.

The 75-member team which raided the facility was looking for

evidence to substantiate the allegations that Rocky Flats had (a) il
legally treated, stored and disposed of hazardous waste in violation of
RCRA; (b) discharged pollutants without a permit in violation of RCRA
and the Clean Water Act; and (c) concealed environmental contamination
(Abas, 1989).
Although the raid on Rocky Flats marked the first time a
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governmental agency had gathered evidence against another federal
facility for the purposes of criminal prosecution, the operation did
not result in the filing of criminal charges against the DOE or Rock
well, the contractor for Rocky Flats.

According to the EPA Criminal

Enforcement director, Dick Emery, as of September 1990 there have been
no charges filed as a result of the raid (Emery, 1990).

In fact, as

little as one month after the raid, Rocky Flats was operating "business
as usual" (Abas, 1989, p. 22).
In September of 1989, Rockwell sued the DOE, alleging that their
company was forced to violate hazardous waste laws because the govern
ment had failed to provide a permanent storage site for liquid wastes
contaminated with non-radioactive toxins (Abas, 1989).

Within days,

Rockwell's contract with the government was terminated.
There is very little information on possible DOE violations of
the Clean Air Act.

Although the DOE must comply with this law, the

contractors, under the agreement with the DOE, are responsible for
reporting possible violations of the Act to the DOE.
obligated to report the violations to the EPA.

The DOE is then

One commentator has

suggested that the DOE is really given powers of self-regulation in
this area (Alverez, 1990).
In the preceding description of the law violations of the DOE,
it is clear that many facilities, as evidenced by the 1986 U.S. General
Accounting Office and many other sources, are engaged in illegal acti
vity.

According to the Head of the Criminal Enforcement Department of

the EPA, a number of complaints have been filed against the complex;
however, there has never been criminal prosecution for the crimes
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engaged in by the weapons complex (Emery, 1990).

In fact, it is offi

cial EPA and United States Department of Justice policy not to take
judicial action against another federal agency over compliance problems
(Porter, 1986);

instead, the EPA "relies exclusively on administrative

enforce- ment" (p. 9).

Other problems exist concerning the enforcement

of environmental crimes committed by the DOE.

As the Center for Defense

Information (1989) states:
The EPA is further handicapped by overlapping laws, a lack of
statistical data on military environmental compliance, mili
tary reluctance to accept EPA oversight, and the fact that
government agencies are constitutionally barred from suing
each other to force compliance with the law. (p. 2)
Although the EPA is precluded by Article III of the United States Con
stitution from prosecuting another federal entity, it does not preclude
the EPA from investigating alleged criminal violations by individuals
at federal facilities (Thompson, 1989).

From 1982 to the present, how

ever, the EPA has acted upon only three of 306 criminal complaints filed
against a DOE employee (Thompson, 1989).

The EPA is also hand-cuffed

because it retains only 47 criminal investigators to combat environ
mental crimes throughout the entire nation (Emery, 1990).

Thus, both

organizational and structural problems make the enforcement of environ
mental laws against the DOE an extremely difficult task.5
The contractors, however, look at the problem of enforcement in
a different manner.

George B. Merrick (1987), former vice-president

of the Rockwell corporation, offers this grievance concerning DOE and
EPA enforcement policy at the Rocky Flats facility:
We are in a position where the Department of Energy requires
us to continue to produce weapons under threat of civil
penalties even though the EPA and Justice Department threaten
to prosecute our people and our company for operations
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essential to that production. We think that such governmental
conduct is unfair, illegal, and unconstitutional. (p. 6)

Summary

The preceding discussion has focused on the environmental crimes
committed during the processes of manufacturing nuclear weapons and
materials. The information presented in this chapter has shown that
not only are the majority of weapons facilities operating illegally,
but also that this illegality is not marginal.

Rather, tremendous

violations have occurred at the various DOE installations. As Thomas
Luken (1989), chair of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazard
ous Materials, concluded, "this is a tremendous and massive amount of
pollution and contamination totally out of compliance, totally out of
control" (p. 1).
Recently, steps have been taken by the Department of Energy to
clean up some of the contamination surrounding its weapons facilities.
However, this attempt to sanitize the facilities began only after
the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union.

After this terrible

accident, the United States became concerned about the safety of its
own facilities because the reactor which malfunctioned in the Soviet
Union was similar in design to many of the reactors used by the United
States for warhead production.

However, many of the efforts to improve

the safety of the United States facilities have focused only on the
technical improvements of reactors (Abas, 1989; Luken, 1989).

Less

attention has been given to the overwhelming problem of contamination
which pervades most facilities.

Nevertheless, several facilities with

in the United States nuclear weapons production complex have gone
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through periods of shutdowns and restarts. Thus, there is some
indication that the government is becoming more concerned with the
awesome consequences of nuclear weapons production.6
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CHAPTER IV

THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION

In the preceding chapters, a number of important features of the
nuclear weapons production complex were identified.
chapter is two-fold.

The purpose of this

First, it will discuss those features of the

weapons production complex which seem to be particularly relevant to a
theoretical interpretation of the crimes committed by this set of
organizations.

This interpretation, grounded in the data presented in

the preceding chapters, leads into the second part of this chapter in
which the utility of the various theoretical perspectives on the causes
of organizational crime are evaluated for their capacity to explain the
criminality of the weapons complex.

The Historical and Structural Formation of Goals

There is little question that organizations carry out most of
their activities in order to reach operative goals.

Most organiza

tional theorists stress the importance of understanding an organi
zation's goals if one seeks insight into organizational behavior.
Therefore, this section will discuss the nuclear weapons production
complex's goals, and the manner in which they were shaped by structural
and historical exigencies.
The United States has been engaged in or preparing for war for
nearly 60 years.

Given that the Cold War military strategies were

largely organized around the capabilities of nuclear weapons, and
44
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that use of atomic weapons played a significant role in ending the
hostilities of World War II, the production of nuclear weapons became
one of the most important United States militarily sponsored programs.
This meant that the organization charged with the responsibility of
developing and producing nuclear weapons warheads had to be, among
other things, highly goal oriented and concerned with performance.
Indeed, the United States depended on these powerful weapons as an
instrument to deter Soviet aggression, and to gain economic and geo
political advantages over those countries which did not possess
nuclear weapons.
Throughout the tenure of the Cold War, United States geo
political and economic interests have caused the United States to
continually upgrade its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction,
which in turn has forced the nuclear weapons production complex to
be even more concerned with the achievement of production goals.
The United States had to match or beat every Soviet advance in
nuclear technology.

For example, after the Soviets' first test of

a nuclear weapon, Truman gave orders to strengthen existing nuclear
weapons production programs and to start production on the hydrogen
bomb.

Historical evidence, then, supports the contention that the

weapons complex's strong commitment to producing nuclear weapons is a
result of the United States' interest in exercising global economic
and political domination (see Chomsky, 1988; Ellsburg, 1981; Williams,
1969; Zinn, 1980).
The data gathered in this research show that a number of histor
ical and structural conditions have played significant roles in
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shaping the criminality of the weapons production complex.

Without

an understanding of the larger geo-political environment in which the
nuclear weapons production complex has developed, a clear understand
ing of the complex's commitment to production goals cannot be ob
tained.
A structural level of analysis, however, is sometimes considered
analogous to an orthodox Marxian approach to criminality wherein cap
italism is identified as a primary structural condition which breeds
criminality.

The drive for profit is considered by those employing

this approach as the primary causal factor in organizational crime.
The current research, however, shows that while a structural level of
analysis is extremely useful in the understanding of the formation of
weapons complex's organizational goals, a purely orthodox Marxist
approach is less valuable.

Rather, a historically grounded structural

analysis, with an emphasis on geo-political factors, is best equipped
to explain the creation of the weapons complex's organizational goals.
Several commentators have concurred with this claim (Alverez, 1990;
Hodges, 1991; Krater, 1991).

The Selection of Means

It is clear that the methods employed to produce nuclear weapons
have resulted in the immense contamination of the environment.

It is

highly unlikely that the Manhattan scientists were unaware of the
adverse consequences of nuclear weapons production given their rela
tively sophisticated understanding of the destructive capabilities of
nuclear weapons.

Moreover, it will be recalled that former AEC General
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Manager Wilson admitted that the AEC neglected the problem of the con
tamination occurring as a result of weapons production.

Given these

insights, and other corroborating evidence, it is reasonable to conclude
that the production goals of the weapons complex have historically taken
primacy, while the adverse environmental consequences of weapons pro
duction have never been a major concern of the contractors, the DOE, or
its predecessors.

Several commentators have agreed with this conclusion

(Alverez, 1990; Center for Defense Information, 1989; Hodges, 1991;
Krater, 1991; Mobilization for Survival, 1989; National Academy of
Sciences, 1987;

Reicher & Scher, 1988).

The Manhattan Project was given one directive:
atomic bomb.

to produce the

At this time, there was little knowledge about the pro

gram dispersed among anyone who was not directly involved in the en
deavor.

Secrecy and a lack of oversight facilitated this rather well.

Because the operation was conducted in such secrecy, the weapons com
plex was free to use any means available to meet its objectives.

Thus,

the scientists and the military officials in charge of the project had
great autonomy in selecting the avenues for the completion of their
mission.
As a result of this autonomy, the weapons complex had simply se
lected the most effective means possible for achieving its goals.

Be

cause there was complete state sponsorship of the endeavor, any method
which facilitated goal attainment was adopted as policy.
Currently, the weapons complex is still selecting those means which
are an effective avenue for goal attainment, and massive contamination
of the environment is still occurring.

The difference, however, between

the contemporary activities of the complex and the circa-World War II
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operations is that laws have been created in the last two decades which
outlaw certain activities of the complex.

Thus, the means that the

weapons complex had employed for decades have now become illegal.

It

seems reasonable, then, to conclude that strain may have existed within
the organization of the complex.

However, as the last portion of this

section will illustrate, there is still little external oversight of
the complex's activities and nearly a total lack of criminal enforce
ment.

Thus, there remains little reason for the complex to adjust its

activities in order to comply with environmental law.

Those means which

are the most effective, regardless of their legality, are still being
employed because of their capacity to facilitate the achievement of the
organization's production goals.7

Oversight

Several commentators have pointed to the lack of external oversight
of the weapons complex's activities (Alverez, 1990; Hodges, 1991;
Krater, 1991; Lamperti, 1984b; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1986).
There is no external, independent review of the DOE's nuclear weapons
production operations.

Unlike the civilian nuclear energy programs,

which are overseen by the NRC, the DOE's operations are mostly selfregulated.

This lack of social control over the complex has been

present through-out the complex's history.

The legacy of secrecy

legitimized by the need to protect "national security" has prevented
most attempts at regulating the weapons complex's activities.

This

problem of creating an independent agency to oversee the complex's
activities is in large part attributable to the defense mechanisms built
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into the United States Constitution and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
In the former case, Article III of the Constitution bars any federal
agency from taking judicial action for the purposes of criminal
prosecution against another federal agency.

In the latter case, most

defense activities are allowed to be exempt from independent oversight,
control, and scrutiny because of "national security" concerns.

Thus,

the operationality of external informal and formal social control
mechanisms is limited.
Equally as absent is inter-organizational oversight.

Many commen

tators have identified this lack of inter-organizational oversight with
in the complex as a contributor to the environmental problems of the
organization (Alverez, 1990; Mobilization for Survival, 1989; National
Academy of Sciences, 1987).

In the most comprehensive study, conducted

by the National Academy of Sciences (1987), several specific problems
were named.
1.

These include:

DOE's over-reliance on the contractors to conduct their

activities in compliance with environmental laws.
2.

Weak ties between the DOE's Environmental, Safety and Health

Department (ES&H) and the field offices.
3.

The need for strengthening the capability of the field offices

to monitor contractor activities.
4.

Episodic and narrowly focused audits and appraisals into the

safety of production reactors.
5.

The DOE has nothing comparable to the offices and divisions of

the NRC charged with research, reactor regulation, inspections, and
event analysis.
Given the insights of the Academy, it is possible to identify three
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general problems in the management structure which contribute to the
lack of inter-organizational oversight within the complex:
1.

A lack of communication between the various parties involved

in the production of nuclear weapons and materials,
2.

DOE's apparent lack of concern for appraising the operations

of the contractors, and
3.

An over-reliance on the contractors to conduct their opera

tions in compliance with applicable laws.
These three problems with the inter-organizational oversight of
the complex have surfaced simultaneously at some points.

For example,

in the years between 1981 and 1987, comprehensive DOE headquarter ap
praisals of contractor performance occurred only twice at the Savannah
facility, and only once at the Hanford plant (National Academy of
Sciences, 1987).
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the contemporary management
structure of the weapons complex has remained nearly identical to that
of the Manhattan Project's.

The lack of inter-organizational oversight

within the weapons complex seems to be the result of the lack of con
cern, conveyed by both the DOE and its contractors, with the adverse
environmental consequences of weapons production.

Many of these prob-

blems seem to reflect the general ideology of the complex:

i.e., the

apparent disregard for the environmental consequences of warhead pro
duction and a sole emphasis on production goals.

Organizational Culture

Because the weapons production complex of today has many
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similarities to that of the earlier weapons operations, it is reason
able to speculate that an organizational "culture" or "philosophy"
has developed within the complex.8 As United States Secretary of Energy
Watkins (quoted in Olshansky & Williams, 1988) has stated:
[the DOE possesses] an underlying philosophy that adequate
production of defense materials and a healthy, safe
environment were not compatibleobj ectives. A culture of
mismanagement and ineptitude will have to be overcome in
[this] department before the nation's troubled nuclear weapons
manufacturing plants can be brought into compliance with
environmental laws.
(p. 29)
This statement, from the Secretary of the DOE himself, lends
support to the notions that (a) environmental criminality actually
exists, and has existed for several years; and (b) production goals have
historically taken precedence over concerns about the environmental
consequences of warhead production.

More importantly, however, is

Watkins' claim that a culture and philosophy exist within the complex.
Watkins makes it clear that the complex's focus on production goals has
existed for many years, and that this organizational ideology is not
aberrant.
culture.

Rather, it is an integral part of the weapons complex's
Senator John Glenn (quoted in Steele, 1989) makes a similar

claim:
The Department of Energy and its predecessors have been
carrying out their mission to produce nuclear weapons with an
attitude of neglect bordering on contempt for environmental
protection what they've said (the DOE) in effect is "we're
going to build bombs and the environment be damned." (p. 17)
Because of the peculiar history of the weapons complex (as a
governmental endeavor which supplied the nation's most important
military weapons), the complex could operate for a sustained period
of time without being subject to external, independent review.

This
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feature of the complex may have permitted the formation of an organi
zational culture which was autonomous and virtually immune from out
side criticism.
Of the many characteristics of the organization of the weapons
production complex, perhaps the most apparent is its tradition of
noncompliance with law.

As a result of placing primacy on production

goals through the most expedient and effective means, the complex has
and continues to engage in the illegal disposal and storage of nuclear
waste.

These illegal practices, then, can be seen as a logical result

of the organization's patterned method of operation.

Since virtually

every weapons production facility is or has operated in violation of one
or more environmental laws, the organization as a whole could be viewed
as a "culture" of noncompliance.
This notion of a culture of noncompliance is drawn from Braithwaite's (1989) idea of "subcultures of resistance."9 Braithwaite
(1989) argues that subcultures of resistance "neutralize the moral
bond of the law (and that) organizations can sustain subcultures of
noncompliance more successfully if they can enforce a code of secrecy
or create a smokescreen of diffused accountability" (p. 346).

This

research has found that it may be possible to apply Braithwaite's notion
to a culture, rather than subculture, of noncompliance.

Indeed, as

Braithwaite suggests, the weapons complex has, in effect, neutralized
commitments, if they were ever existent, to lawful organizational
behavior.

Additionally, Braithwaite's idea that both secrecy and

the "smokescreen" effect facilitate the successful resistance of laws
is clearly insightful, given the legacy of secrecy and diffused
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accountability within the weapons complex.
While the identification of the weapons complex as a culture of
noncompliance may be an important contribution in the theoretical
understanding of state-corporate crime, the purpose of this section
has been to highlight the idea that the weapons complex, as a result
of external structural and historical factors, has developed a pat
terned organizational method of operation.

This can be characterized

as one which places the achievement of production goals in high pri
ority, and which has been largely autonomous, isolated, and self
regulating.
Having discussed the most salient features of the nuclear weapons
production complex which have clear associations with the illegal acts
of the organization, this chapter will now turn to an examination of
the utility of the various theoretical perspectives on the causes of
organizational crime to explain the crimes of the weapons complex.

Each

major theoretical position on organizational crime reviewed in Chapter I
of this research will now be examined.

Evaluation of the Theoretical Perspectives on Organizational Crime

Differential Association Theory

The central notion of differential association theory is that
criminal behavior is learned in association with intimate others by
interacting and communicating with those significant others.

Thus,

crime is seen as a manifestation of an individual's social-psychological
interaction with those who define criminal behavior favorably.

While
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this research may not be able to confirm or refute the utility of
differential association theory to explain the crimes of the weapons
complex, some evidence has been found which supports Sutherland's
(1949) model.
This research has pointed to the possibility that the nuclear
weapons production complex has developed a culture.

It seems reason

able, then, to speculate that certain ideas and values concerning
organizational norms have been instilled in those workers who are
members of the weapons complex.

That is, it is possible, and very

likely, that individuals are socialized into the general ideology
of the complex.

Thus, the socialization of workers in the complex

could act to perpetuate the continued use of illegitimate means for
achieving organizational goals.

If this were the case, which needs

to be determined empirically rather than speculatively, Sutherland's
differential association theory could provide valuable insights into
the process of organizational socialization.
Because of the limitations of the data in this research, it is not
possible to fully evaluate the utility of differential association
theory to explain the crimes of the weapons complex.

It is clear that

future research is needed which addresses the role of social learning
and its association, if any, with the crimes of the nuclear weapons
production complex.

The Organizational Perspective

There are three central notions contained within the organizational
perspective on organizational crime:

(1) organizational goals, (2) the
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distribution of legitimate and illegitimate means, and (3) social
control.

In this section, these central notions will be evaluated

for their capacity to shed insight into the crimes committed by the
nuclear weapons production complex.
A central tenet of the organizational perspective on crime is
that organizations are, by their very nature, strongly goal oriented
and concerned with performance.

Since most organizations are evaluated

by their success in goal attainment, it is argued by these theorists
that the organization feels pressure to achieve its goals. As demon
strated earlier in this research, the weapons complex has been extremely
concerned with its performance, and has developed a strong commitment to
its operative goals.

Thus, the notion that organizations are deeply

concerned with performance and the attainment of organizational goals
has been supported in this research.
Most organizational theorists explain the particular causes of
organizational crime through the Mertonian notion of innovation.

This

notion rests on the idea that an organization will employ legitimate
means for achieving its goals if those means are available.

If, how

ever, legitimate means for achieving goals are blocked, an organization
will experience strain, and thus select illegitimate means for achieving
its goals.

Innovation, then, is a result of the blockage of legitimate

means, and the decision to use illegitimate means for achieving organi
zational goals.

This notion assumes that an organization alters its

behavior or mode of operation because of strain.
The weapons complex operated for nearly three decades without being
subject to official regulatory law.

Because of secrecy, and the absence
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of social control over its activities, the weapons complex experienced
great autonomy in selecting the means for achieving its goal to produce
nuclear weapons. Thus, because of the absence of any party capable of
defining the organization's activities as legitimate or illegitimate,
the weapons complex's means for achieving organizational goals were not
blocked, and organizational strain did not surface.
In the period between 1970 and 1977, however, regulations on the
nuclear industry began to surface.

Primarily aimed at the rapidly grow

ing civilian nuclear industry, the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water
Act (1972), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1977) were
passed to prevent further environmentally damaging acts committed by the
governmental nuclear industry.

These laws set standards on radioactive

and hazardous waste disposal both in the air and in the water.

To be in

compliance with these new laws, the weapons production complex would
have to adjust its production practices and concern itself with the safe
disposal of nuclear waste.
Following the Mertonian rational goals blocked notion, it would
seem reasonable to identify, during this period of time, the existence
of organizational strain within the complex.
one time permitted were now illegal.

Activities which were at

Thus, the organizational theorists

would argue that a threat to the organization's attainment of goals
surfaced because its means were now criminalized.

However, the organi

zation did not adjust its behavior after the birth of these laws.
did not react to strain because it experienced no strain.

It

For the

Mertonian notion of innovation to apply, there must be the confronta
tion of strain, a blockage of goals which leads to an adjustment of
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organizational behavior.

However, there was no official enforcement

of these new laws directed at the weapons complex.

The enforcement

of these laws was aimed at the civilian industry, even though the wea
pons complex was also subject to these laws.

Thus, the organization

was using means defined as illegitimate, but their activities were not
being officially monitored, enforced, or sanctioned.

The complex did

not have to adapt to external strain, rather the lack of enforcement
and social control encouraged the now defined illegal acts. The com
plex simply sustained its 30-year-old mode of operation.

Thus, this

research has found that organizational criminality does not neces
sarily result from the blockage of legitimate means and strain.

Since

most theories of organizational crime rely largely on the notions of
strain and innovation, this finding represents an important contribution
to the understanding of organizational criminality.10
The lack of enforcement of environmental laws by the EPA on the
weapons complex permitted the complex to maintain its mode of operation.
Both formal and informal social control of the complex's activities were
absent.

Thus, the organizational perspective's notion of the influence

of social control plays an important role in the complex's criminality;
however, it is in quite a different sense.
Most organizational theorists stress the importance of the operationality of external social control mechanisms (see Finney & Lesieur,
1982; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990).

They argue that illegitimate means

to achieving organizational goals can be blocked if there is effective
social control.

However, in the case of the weapons complex, social

control is important not because of its potential for curbing deviant
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means, but for allowing organizational criminality to occur.
tion is not the issue, rather existence.

Propor

Although speculative, but

consistent with the organizational theorists' notion of social control,
if there were social control over the complex's activities, perhaps the
organization's autonomy could have been limited, and thus be incapable
of sustaining its environmentally contaminating activities.

Historic

ally, we have seen, there has never been any real control, formal or
informal, over the complex's activities.

The secretive nature of its

operations, facilitated by the government, precluded any real public,
congressional, or independent oversight.

Thus, when the complex was

confronted with the fact that there were laws governing their disposal
activities, the organization did not experience strain because there was
no source of strain, no agency to force it to comply with these laws.
There was no motivation, or reason, for the weapons complex to adjust
its behavior because organizational goals were being attained quite
efficiently through the use of traditional means.

Rather than stressing

the role of an organization's motive for adapting to strain (Coleman,
1987; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990) for the weapons production complex,
the salient issue is its motivation for sustaining its activities.
Thus, motivation is indeed an important consideration, for it illus
trates the important role organizational goals play in the etiology of
organizational crime.

However, its importance for explaining the

crimes of the nuclear weapons production complex lies on a different
plane.
There is no doubt that employing the organizational level of
analysis. with a historical focus, can be extremely insightful when
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analyzing the crimes of the weapons complex.

Equally as valuable is

the notion that organizational goals play a large role in organiza
tional criminality.

An atomistic level of explanation would preclude

the consideration of the structural and institutional factors which
contributed to the complex's criminality.

Yet, the utility of the

specific notions contained within the organizational perspective
(strain and innovation) to explain the etiology of the weapons com
plex's crime is limited.

The Political Economy Perspective

The political economy perspective on organizational crime stresses
the primacy of capitalistic structures as an inducement for organiza
tions to enter into illegal activity.

The primary assumption of this

perspective is that the structure of corporate capitalism provides an
incentive for organizations to use illegitimate means toward achieving
profit, if legitimate means are blocked.

This perspective extends the

Mertonian rational goals blocked model offered by the organizational
theorists by considering the dynamics of capitalism, and how this mode
of production generates illegal activity.
The utility of the rational goals blocked version of the political
economy approach to explain the crimes of the weapons production complex
is limited.

From the beginning of the atomic age, the United States

government has made several different types of arrangements with cor
porations who actually produce nuclear weapons. Many of the facilities
have been operated on a non-profit basis.

Included in this category is

the Savannah River Plant, a facility with one of the worst records of
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environmental compliance.

Thus, having no motive to accumulate capital

or to supersede laws for the purposes of gaining organizational economic
profit, the crimes committed by these facilities are not explainable by
using the traditional political economy approach.

The Integrated Theoretical Perspectives

Coleman's (1987) theoretical explanation of organizational crime is
grounded in the notion that individual psychological motivations and the
structural dynamics of corporate capitalism are the two primary causes
of organizational crime.

In this chapter, we have already addressed the

utility of the political economy and social-psychological perspectives
to explain the weapons complex's criminal actions.

The ability of the

former perspective to explain the crimes of the weapons complex cannot
be fully determined because of the limited amount of data collected
concerning this level of analysis.

We have also found that the

political economy perspective cannot fully explain the environmental law
violations.
Braithwaite's (1989) integrated theory of organizational crime is
primarily based on a Mertonian rational goals blocked model and sub
culture theory.

As we have seen, the Mertonian notion of innovation

does not adequately explain the crimes of the weapons complex.

The

complex, it will be recalled, has never experienced strain, nor has it
had any of its means considered illegitimate.

Braithwaite's general

theory maintains little capacity to shed theoretical insight into the
causes of the crimes of the weapons complex.

His idea of subcultures of

resistance, however, has been reworked in this research to explain the
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possibility that a noncompliant culture exists within the weapons
complex.

In this regard, Braithwaite's conceptualization of organi

zational crime is useful.
Kramer and Michalowski's (1990) integrated theory of organiza
tional crime is perhaps the most comprehensive model that exists in
the literature.

This theory is based on the hypothesis that organi

zational crime results from a coincidence of appropriate motivation or
performance pressure, absent effective social control.
As we have seen, the weapons complex has historically been pres
sured to meet production goals, and has experienced no real social
control.

Thus, on a general level, this research lends support to

Kramer and Michalowski's hypothesis, especially on the structural and
institutional level of analyses. This research has documented several
times that the weapons complex has experienced little social control,
but great pressure to meet production goals.
However, Kramer and Michalowski's model also rests largely on the
Mertonian notion of strain, and the role of the distribution of legiti
mate and illegitimate means. This research has shown that the weapons
complex has never experienced a measurable amount of strain--that, in
fact, the complex has been virtually immune from agents which may cause
strain.

Thus, the data presented in this research lend support to

Kramer and Michalowski's general hypothesis, but clearly do not sup
port the rational goals blocked idea central to their theoretical model.
Because of the limitations of the data in this research, this
study cannot verify the value of other notions contained in Kramer and
Michalowski's (1990) theory.

For example, this research cannot
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determine the role that individual members of the organization play in
the crimes of the complex.

Indeed, the role that an individual's

symbolic structure of goals, alternatives, and responsibility plays has
not been measured in this research.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The three objectives of this research were:
1.

To identify the characteristics of the environmental law

violations committed during the production of nuclear weapons,
2.

To identify the historical forces and events which have

contributed to those violations, and
3.

To use the illegal acts of the

nuclear weapons production

complex as a case study to help adjudicate between a number of compet
ing explanations of the causes of organizational crime.

This research

has provided some answers to these central issues.
We have found that the environmental law violations committed by
the nuclear weapons production complex are primarily the result of
inadequate nuclear waste disposal practices.

Nuclear waste is commonly

dumped into ponds or basins which leak.Thus, not only

does the soil

surrounding the facilities become contaminated, but the groundwater as
well.

This method of disposal has been employed throughout the tenure

of the weapons complex to dispose of unwanted waste generated from
weapons production.

The problem is so acute that contaminated ground

water at one facility has entered a large aquifer which provides a
large portion of the drinking water to the south-eastern portion of
the nation.

These waste disposal activities violate several laws,

especially the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 which
outlaws waste disposal practices which allow contaminants to enter the
63
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environment in excess of EPA standards.
This research has been conducted with a special interest in the
history of the weapons production complex.

We have seen that nuclear

weapons have played an extremely important role in United States'
military planning and operations.

During the unstable political cli

mate of the World War II and Cold War eras, the weapons production
complex had experienced immense pressure from the federal government
to produce weapons. This pressure resulted in the weapons complex
decision to use the most efficient and effective means to achieve its
goals.

This research has also pointed to the lack of oversight over

the complex's activities.

The complex has never been officially regu

lated by any independent agency, nor has it ever been subject to the
strict guidelines concerning nuclear waste disposal methods which
govern the practices of civilian nuclear activities.
This research has found that the environmental law violations
committed by the nuclear weapons production complex are a result of
immense performance pressure, organizational goals, historical exigen
cies, poor management, and an absence of social control.

These im

portant factors in the etiology of the environmental crimes committed
by the weapons complex have been juxtaposed to the general theoretical
models on the causes of organizational crime.
The final objective of this research has been to evaluate the
utility of the various theoretical perspectives on the causes of
organizational crime to explain the crimes of the nuclear weapons
production complex.

Because of the limitations of the data, however,

this objective has only been partially met.

Few data were presented
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in this research concerning the possible social-psychological motiva
tions for individuals working within the weapons complex to engage in
criminality.

However, other theoretical models which lie on different

levels of analyses have been evaluated.
The organizational perspective on organizational crime gives us
some insight into the causal factors involved in the crimes of the
weapons complex.

We have found that the pressure placed on the weapons

complex to achieve organizational goals has been immense, and that this
pressure has resulted in the lack of concern for producing
weapons in an environmentally sound manner.

nuclear

Additionally, the organi

zational perspective helps explain why the weapons complex selected
certain avenues for achieving its production goals; they were simply
the most effective and efficient.

However, the utility of the organi

zational perspective to fully explain the crimes of the weapons complex
is limited because the model is largely based on the Mertonian notions
of strain and innovation.
The ability of the political economy theoretical position on
organizational crime to explain the crimes of the weapons complex is
limited.

Because many of the operators of weapons production facilities

do so under a non-profit arrangement with the DOE, there is no motiva
tion for profit, a major cause of organizational crime according to the
political economy approach advocates.
The integrated theoretical models on the organizational causes
also possess limited faculties for explaining the causes of the crimes
of the nuclear weapons complex.

Because Coleman's (1987) and Braith

waite 's (1989) models rely so heavily on either the social-psychological
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level, or the political economy level of analysis, this research has
either not found support, or been unable to test, their theories.
However, this research has found support for Kramer and Michalowski's
(1990) integrated theoretical model.

While their basic hypothesis has

been supported by this research, specific notions contained in their
theory (Merton's innovation and the distribution of means), do not shed
insight into the possible causes of the weapons complex's criminality.

Future Research

There are several ways that the understanding of the crimes of the
weapons complex could be deepened.

More research is needed which places

a special focus on the micro-organizational level of analysis.

For

instance, this research, through a structural level of analysis, has
pointed to the possibility that an organizational culture may exist
within the complex.

Important questions such as the precise effect of

this organization's general operating procedure on the institution's
workers or the role that alienation plays in the perpetuation of
organizational criminality, have not been presented in this research.
Neither has this study delved into the social-psychological motivation
for the weapons complex workers to continue to engage in illegal
activity.

Future research needs to be directed on this more micro level

of analysis in order for a full explanation of the weapons complex's
criminality to surface.
Other issues have been raised by this research which should be
explored in future research.

For example, one could study the weapons

production complex of the Soviet Union to determine what differences
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exist between the two superpowers' operative agendas.

There is also a

need for research which examines the results of one federal agencyoverseeing the activities of another federal agency.

Questions such as

these could certainly deepen our understanding of the weapons complex's
role in the totality

of United States governmental operations.

Another direction that could be pursued in future research is
through the use of a different paradigmatic approach.

Using a social

constructionist perspective, a scholar could begin to answer important
questions such as the manner in which environmental laws are created.
Additionally, a social constructionist perspective could offer deeper
insights into the reasons why the weapons complex has evaded deviant
labels.

Clearly, the research questions of such phenomenological

studies would be of a different nature than this research's objectives.
However, using a multiple paradigmatic approach to the crimes of the
weapons complex could provide a deeper understanding of environmental
law and state-corporate crime.
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ENDNOTES

1The organizational theorists do not employ the notion of social
control in the manner offered by Hirschi (1969). Rather, social control
is considered to represent the external, independent oversight of
organizational activities. It is in this sense that the notion of
social control is used in this research.
2Perdue (1989) has argued that the Department of Energy could be
more appropriately referred to as the "Department of Nuclear Weapons."
3RCRA's applicability to federal agencies is limited to the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Department of Energy. While
the DOD did not contest the applicability of the law to its activities,
the DOE did raise serious objections to the applicability of the law.
4Facilities reviewed by the study were the Feeds Material Plant,
Manford, Los Alamos, Mound, Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats, and the Savannah
River Plant.
5Although there have been no criminal charges filed against the
Department of Energy, there have been two instances in which the organi
zation has been sued by citizens allegedly stricken with cancer because
of DOE operations at its weapons production facilities. Both lawsuits
were dismissed at the district court level, on the grounds that the
Department of Energy's nuclear production activities are protected under
the government's right of "sovereign immunity" (Conner, 1990).
6Although there has been some indication that the United States
government and the DOE are allocating more resources to environmental
protection, several instances point to the contrary. Most notably is
the June 1991 decision to the United States Senate to take $108 million
originally targeted for environmental clean-up and devote that money to
warhead production (Gelb, 1991).
7There is little question that the means employed by the weapons
complex to achieve organizational goals can be considered socially
injurious. Indeed, the contamination of the groundwater and air have
caused severe environmental, health, and safety problems. Using a
redefined notion of crime commonly offered by critical criminologists,
one could apply the label of "crime" to these pre-1970 waste disposal
practices. The actions of the complex, then, could be seen as crimes of
omission, rather than of commission; i.e., safeguards were not created
to contain the disastrous effects of warhead production. Given the fact
that the post-1970 waste disposal practices of the complex are criminal
in the legalistic sense, one could argue that the activities of the
nuclear weapons production complex have been historically criminal.

68
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aThe existence of an organizational "culture" within the weapons
complex must be established empirically. However, because of the
limitations of the data in this research, this study cannot provide
empirical support for this idea. The following discussion, then, is an
attempt to point to the possibility that a culture exists within the
complex and how that culture could be characterized through additional
research.
9This discussion is not intended to evaluate the utility of
Braithwaite's theory to explain the crimes of the weapons complex.
Rather, the discussion is limited to the notion he has set forth
concerning organizational subcultures of resistance. Braithwaite's
integrated theory of organizational crime will be fully reviewed in the
last section of this chapter.
10The organizational theorists do not consider the possibility that
an organization may create new goals and new means for achieving these
goals. Indeed, the Manhattan scientists did create the goal of
producing nuclear weapons and the practice for means for achieving that
goal. Thus, it may seem reasonable to argue that Merton's notion of
rebellion could be useful in interpreting the crimes of the complex.
However, the Manhattan scientists did not eschew traditional goals and
means; rather, they were created independently of society. Moreover,
this research has shown that the nuclear weapons production complex has
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Functions of the Department of Energy's
Nuclear Weapons Facilities

1.

Livermore National Laboratory. Livermore, California.
Function: Design Nuclear Weapons.

2.

Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Function: Design Nuclear Weapons.

3.

Nevada Test Site. Las Vegas, Nevada.
Function: Test Nuclear Weapons.

4.

Sandia National Laboratories. Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Function: Provide Engineering Support.

5.

Feeds Material Production Center. Fernald, Ohio.
Function: Produce Uranium Metal Cores.

6. Hanford Reservation. Hanford, Washington.
Function: Recycle Uranium and Extract Plutonium.
7.

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Function: Recycle Uranium.

8.

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
Function: Enrich Uranium

9.

Portsmouth Uranium Enrichment Complex.
Function: Enrich Uranium.

Idaho Falls, Idaho.

Paducah, Kentucky.

Piketon, Ohio.

10. Savannah River Plant. Aiken, South Carolina.
Function: Produce Plutonium and Tritium.
11. Kansas City Plant. Kansas City, Missouri.
Function: Manufacture Electronic Components.
12. Mound Plant. Dayton, Ohio.
Function: Manufacture Detonators.
13. Pantex Plant. Amarillo, Texas.
Function: Assemble and Disassemble Weapons.
14. Pinellas Plant. Clearwater, Florida.
Produce Neutron Generators.
15.

Rocky Flats Plant. Denver, Colorado.
Function: Assemble Plutonium Triggers.

16.

Y-12 Plant. Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Function: Produce Uranium Components.
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Appendix A--Continued

17.

Waste Isolation Plant. Carlsbad, New Mexico.
Function: Dispose Radioactive Waste.
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Additional Information on the Unstructured Interviews

All of the individuals interviewed in this study, with the excep
tion of Richard Emery, were asked one basic question:

"In your opinion,

what are the primary causes of the environmental crimes committed by
the nuclear weapons production complex?"

The interviewees were then

asked to elaborate on their ideas concerning the causes of the crimes
in question.

If, during the process of the interview, the interviewee

had not addressed any historical features of the complex which may have
contributed to the environmental crimes, they were asked, "What histori
cal events and policies, in your opinion, have played a significant role
in the shaping of the nuclear weapons production complex's criminality?"
Richard Emery, the director of the Criminal Division of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, was asked one basic question:

"Are

you aware of any attempt by your department or of the U.S. Department
of Justice to recommend the criminal prosecution of the Department of
Energy or a DOE contractor for environmental crimes?"
Ultimately, the data gathered through these interviews did not
shed insight into any new, or unexplored information, not already
obtained through other data collection techniques.

Rather, the data

gathered from the interviews served to confirm already obtained ideas
about the causes of the environmental crimes committed by the nuclear
weapons production complex.

This has had the effect of increasing the

validity of this research.
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Appendix B--Continued

Interviewee Names and Affiliations:
Robert Alverez:

Researcher with the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, U. S. Congress.

Richard Emery:

Director of the Criminal Enforcement Division
of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency.

Jeff Hodges:

Legislative Researcher and Assistant to
Representative John Dingell, U. S. Congress.

Jeff Krater:

Legislative Researcher and Assistant for
Representative John Dingell, U. S. Congress.
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